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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction of this court is based upon U.C.A. § 78-2-2 (4): The Supreme Court may 
transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over which the Supreme Court has original 
appellate jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Did the trial court err by holding that the Plaintiffs battery claims were barred by the 
statute of limitations, and that plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to support her other claims 
when viewed in the light most favorable to her? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
On review of a grant of summary judgment or a motion on the pleadings treated as a motion 
for summary judgment under Rule 12, the party against whom the judgment has been granted is 
entitled to have all the facts presented and all the inferences fairly arising therefrom considered in a 
light most favorable to him. Morris v. Farnsworth Motel 123 Utah 289 259 P.2d 297 (1953) 
Moreover, the appellate court reviews conclusions of law for correctness without according 
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Bonham v. Morgan 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989). 
AUTHORITIES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE 
Plaintiff is unaware of any Utah case that addresses the standard to which attorneys are 
held in the context of sexual relationships with their clients. However, plaintiff relies on 
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Kilpatrick v. Wiley, 909 P.2d 1283, 1289 (Utah App. 1996), for support for her claims of breach 
of fiduciary duty as well as her analysis of causation under several different theories. This case is 
also instructive on the standard attorneys should generally be held to in their dealing with their 
clients. Plaintiff also relies on cases from other jurisdictions for the proposition that attorneys 
who engage in sexual relations with their clients should he held liable for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. These authorities include McDaniel v. Gile, 230 Cal. App. 3d 363,281 Cal. 
Rptr. 242 (Cal.App.Dist.2 05/21/1991) and Maria Del Rosario Vallino v. Edmond A. DiSandro 
etal.RI.35 (1997). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff retained Defendant, an attorney, to represent her in a divorce matter. It is 
undisputed that a romantic and sexual relationship arose as a result of this representation, 
although the question of when the relationship commenced is disputed by the parties. Plaintiff 
alleges that Defendant took advantage of the attorney client relationship to obtain sexual favors 
from the plaintiff and that he committed fraud and breached his fiduciary duty to the plaintiff in 
using client confidences to coerce the Plaintiff into engaging in a sexual relationship with him. 
Plaintiff alleges that as a result of these actions, she has suffered severe emotional harm. 
Plaintiff filed her complaint against defendant on February 2,2001. Defendant filed a motion to 
dismiss and an affidavit and requested that the court convert Defendant's Motion to Dismiss to a 
Motion for Summary Judgment. The Trial Court, Honorable Stephen L. Henriod presiding, 
granted Defendant's Motion to Convert. Oral argument on Defendant's Motion for Summary 
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Judgment was held on September 11, 2001, and a minute entry granting Defendant's Motion was 
entered on October 4, 2001. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
L From June, 1998 through October, 2000, Walter was a client of Attorney Stewart. 
2. From June, 1998 through April, 1999, Stewart represented Walter in a divorce action. 
3. During the years noted above, from 1998 through 2000, Stewart was a member of the Utah 
State Bar, and a practicing attorney within the State of Utah. 
4. Throughout the years specified, Stewart used means available to him as a lawyer and 
confidant to establish intimate sexual contact with Walter under false pretenses and fraudulent 
misrepresentation. 
5. From June, 1998 through October, 2000, Stewart sexually preyed upon and sexually abused 
and harassed Walter. 
6. From 1998 through 2000, Stewart used his position, authority, status, influence, and power as 
a lawyer to sexually pursue, harass, subdue, dominate, abuse, and take advantage of Walter. 
7. From 1998 through 2000, Stewart engaged in the following conduct towards Walter and 
perpetrated the following acts upon Walter: continual misrepresentation regarding his marital status, 
pressuring for sexual favors and promises to marry Plaintiff. Use of his superiority in position, 
experience and attorney, as described in paragraphs 18 and 19 above to wrongfully induce Walter to 
participate in sexual activities. 
8. In 1999, the inappropriate sexual behavior inflicted by Stewart upon Walter as described 
above, was frequent, at times daily. Walter relied upon Stewart's representations, and would never 
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have engaged in a sexual relationship had she known the truth. 
9. In 1999, the sexual behavior inflicted by Stewart upon Walter as described above, arose as a 
result of, and during the course of, and by means of, the membership of Stewart as a member of the 
Utah State Bar and his positions of trust as Walter's attorney. Much of this inappropriate sexual 
behavior occurred in the apartment of Plaintiff, during a period of time Plaintiff was especially 
vulnerable as a result of her divorce and her emotional dependency upon her attorney who was her 
agent in that procedure. 
10. Stewart allowed his sexual relationship with Walter to affect his representation of her to 
Walter's detriment. Stewart advised Walter that she should not pay money she owed to her husband 
as part of the property settlement in her divorce action, because she would be able to avoid the debt 
by moving to Maryland. Stewart then failed to notify Walter that her divorce was finalized and that 
she was free to move to Maryland as she desired. Instead, he delayed informing Walter of her 
divorce in order to continue his sexual advances against Walter as alleged above. 
11. Stewart accepted sexual favors as tacit payment for his services. Stewart represented Walter 
in a show cause hearing because she had not paid her husband based on Stewart's advice. Stewart 
did not bill Walter for his services in representing her but did press her for sex. After successfully 
representing Walter in a name change action, Stewart grabbed Walter around the waist and asked 
Walter to have sex with him. 
12. Stewart allowed his sexual relationship with Walter to cloud his professional judgment. 
Stewart advised Walter she could change her name during her divorce proceeding. Walter later 
learned that this name change had delayed Plaintiffs international adoption case and would require 
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an additional court appearance. Stewart allowed his sexual relationship with his client to cloud his 
judgment. As a result of these actions Walter incurred additional expense and frustration in 
processing her international adoption. She also suffered emotional harm as a result of Stewart's 
actions. 
13. Walter confided intimate details of her marriage and divorce and of her emotional state to 
Stewart. Stewart was aware that Walter was emotionally fragile and insecure. 
14. Stewart deceived Walter as to his actual marital status. Had Walter known the truth 
regarding the marital status of Stewart, she would never have consented to any form of intimate 
contact whatever. 
15. Stewart was aware that his sexual relationship, his sexual manipulation and his 
misrepresentations to Walter about his marital status would cause Plaintiff severe emotional harm. 
16. In 1999 and as a result of the sexual abuse described above, Walter was traumatized, 
disoriented, isolated, felt abandoned, felt helpless, felt worthless, frightened, depressed, and 
paralyzed. More and more she found herself to be in the grip and power of Stewart. 
17. From 1998 through 2000, by a combination of means, including fraud, power, coercion, 
intimidation, shaming, cajolery, trust, confidentiality, and false representations, Stewart induced 
Walter to engage in sexual intercourse and to remain silent respecting the sexual activities of Stewart 
and Walter. 
18. In 2000, and as a result of the sexual abuse described above, Walter became mentally 
distraught. She suffered enormous psychic pain. She became incapacitated emotionally to a nearly 
irreversible extent. She required psychological treatment as a direct result of Stewart's action. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Under either a motion to dismiss standard or a summary judgment standard the Plaintiffs 
allegations in her complaint and affidavit, viewed in the light most favorable to her, support 
several causes of action against the Defendant. There are several material issues of fact in 
dispute which, if proved, would allow a jury to find in the Plaintiffs favor. Thus, the decision of 
the trial court should be reversed and plaintiff should be allowed to submit her evidence to a jury. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ALLOWING THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS TO BE CONVERTED INTO A MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and 
not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed 
of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all 
material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. URCP 12 (b) (7). 
It is generally not well advised to treat a motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment. 
Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 570 P.2d 119 (Utah 1977). The rationale for this is obvious: 
until the parties have had the opportunity to conduct discovery, a claimant may be prejudiced by 
having to assert facts s/he has not yet had a chance to evaluate or even discover. Under 
defendant's reading of the statute, any motion to dismiss can be converted to a motion for 
summary judgment and circumvent the discovery process merely by having the defendant submit 
an affidavit with the motion. 
The statute requires that in order for a rule 12(b) (6) motion to be converted to a motion 
for summary judgment, matters outside the pleadings must be presented to the court. However, 
in this case, the only supporting material presented with the pleadings were the affidavits of the 
parties. However, those affidavits addressed matters which were wholly within the scope of the 
pleadings. 
While Defendant has claimed that Plaintiff failed to object to Plaintiffs motion to convert 
his motion to a motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff, in her memorandum in opposition to 
Defendant's motion to dismiss requested that the court "dismiss the motion in its entirety". A 
motion for dismissal should properly be treated as an objection. Moreover in this context, failure 
to object cannot be construed as consent. State of Utah v. Demar W. Nilson 854 P.2d 1029, 214 
Utah Adv. Rep. 45. (facts of this case do not allow us to construe Nilson's articulated lack of 
objection as constituting consent to the State's motion to dismiss.) see also Ambrose (failure to 
object or silence should not be construed as implied consent. Ambrose, 598 P.2d at 360.) 
Accordingly, the order of the trial court should be reversed, and either remanded for a hearing on 
a motion to dismiss, or, if this court so chooses, this court should treat the motion as a motion to 
dismiss and review this appeal as an appeal from a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6). 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO APPLY THE PROPER LEGAL 
STANDARD TO THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS. 
Assuming arguendo and in the alternative that converting the motion to dismiss to a motion 
for summary judgment was permissible, the Trial Court applied the wrong standard to the motion for 
summary judgment. On a motion for summary judgment, if there is any genuine issue as to any 
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material fact, the motion should be denied. Young v. Felorina, 121 Utah 646, 244 P.2d 862 cert, 
denied 344 US 886 (1952). see also Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613 (Utah 1982) (a motion for 
summary judgment should be denied where the evidence presents a genuine issue of material fact 
which if resolved in favor of the non-moving party would entitle him to judgment as a matter of 
law). Moreover on a motion for summary judgment it is not appropriate for a court to weigh 
disputed evidence, W.M. Barned Co. v. Sohio Natural Resources Co. 627 P.2d 56 (Utah 1981), nor 
is it necessary for the non-moving party to prove its legal theory; it is only necessary for the non-
moving party to show "facts" controverting the "facts" stated in the moving parties affidavit. Salt 
Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
The Trial Court's error on this point is illustrated by the following exchange from the 
summary judgment hearing: 
MS. MCCONOE: Your Honor, it's not the purpose of a summary judgment 
procedure to judge the credibility of the averments of parties or witnesses. 
THE COURT: Yes, it is. When one party makes a properly supported motion for 
summary judgment, the other party has the obligation to come forward with factual 
information indicating there's a legal basis for the claim. 
Transcript of Motion for Summary Judgment September 11,2001 before Judge Stephen L. 
Henroid, p. 19. 
Indeed, the Transcript of the hearing is replete with instances where the court attempts to 
weigh the sufficiency of the underlying claims, rather than assess whether disputed issues of fact 
exist. However, these examples, while helpful in explaining how this case came before the Court of 
Appeals are not really relevant, since the standard of review for the Court of Appeals is for 
correctness, without deference to the to the trial court's legal conclusions. Ralph L. Wadsworth 
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Constr. Inc., v. West Jordan City, 2000 UT App 49,999 P.2d 1240. Accordingly, each of plaintiffs 
claims will be discussed below both for sufficiency under a Rule 12(b)(6) standard and under a 
summary judgment standard. 
III. THERE ARE MANY MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT IN DISPUTE. 
Some of the most critical issues in this case turn on whether the plaintiff was represented by 
the defendant at the time certain incidents, including sexual incidents took place. Defendant 
contends as a core part of his argument that he did not represent Plaintiff during the time that he was 
having a sexual relationship with her. However, the dates of representation as well as when the 
relationship ended are all disputed by the parties. These issues are material because among other 
things, they go to the issue of whether and when the defendant owed a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff. 
Importantly, defendant never withdrew his representation of the Plaintiff in a judicial forum. The 
following table illustrates some of the disputed issues of fact contained in the pleadings: 
Defendant's Statement of Indisputable Disputed by Plaintiffs Statement of 
Facts Disputed Facts I 
1. Alan Steward is an attorney 
2. Alan Stewart was retained by Walters 
3. Matter was settled on Feb 18, 1999. 
4, Divorce Decree was entered on April 
26,1999 
5. Romantic relationship began June 1999 
6. Walter retained Alan Stewart again in 
| Aug. 1999 
7. Alan Stewart terminated his relationship 
with Walter 
8. Alan Stewart represented Walter on a 
probate matter after the relationship 
terminated 
Not disputed 
Not disputed 
Disputed by Walter's statements # 1,2,3, 1 
and 5. 
Not Disputed 
Disputed by Walter's statement #5 
Disputed by Walter's statement #6, 7, and 
8. 
Disputed by Walter's statement #10, and 
in Walter's affidavit 
Disputed by Walter's statement #10 and in 
Walter's affidavit. 
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Additionally, the respective affidavits of the parties contain numerous other disputed material issues 
of fact. A more complete list of disputed issues of fact is included in the discussion of the Plaintiffs 
substantive claims below. 
IV, PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS IN HER COMPLAINT AND AFFIDAVIT, 
VIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO HER, SUPPORT SEVERAL 
CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANT. THERE ARE SEVERAL 
MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT IN DISPUTE WHICH, IF PROVED, WOULD 
ALLOW A JURY TO FIND IN THE PLAINTIFF'S FAVOR. 
A. BATTERY 
While Walter is not aware of any Utah cases bearing directly on whether Stewarts' conduct 
amounted to battery, the Illinois case of Kling v. Landry, 686 N.E.2d 33 (111. App. 2 Dist.1997) is 
instructive. Among other things, in Kling, the court undertook review of the lower court's dismissal 
of the Plaintiffs allegation against the defendant. Plaintiff alleged her attorney (defendant) 
committed battery against her when he came to her home, ostensibly to prepare for upcoming 
hearings, and had sex with the defendant. Plaintiff alleged on two occasions defendant came to her 
home, took off her clothes and initiated sexual intercourse. Further, the plaintiff alleged defendant 
was aware she suffered from "mental impairments which could affect her ability to make reasonable 
decisions and judgments." Id. at 36. 
The lower court dismissed plaintiffs claim of battery for failure to state facts sufficient to 
sustain a cause of action. In reversing the lower court's decision, the Illinois Appellate Court 
recognized, in effect, that courts should analyze the entirety of the circumstances surrounding an 
alleged cause of action (emphasis added). The Kling court found even though plaintiff did not 
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allege defendant's touching was without consent, "she nonetheless alleges that the conduct was 
without permission and provocation" and concluded plaintiff stated facts sufficient to sustain a cause 
of action for battery. Id. at 41. 
Analyzing the totality of the circumstances in the instant case, Stewarts' coercion of Walter 
and abuse of her trust was the means Stewart used to commit a battery on the Plaintiff. In order to 
satisfy his own prurient interests and appetites and to keep her in Utah, Stewart lied to Walter about 
the status of her divorce, telling her the opposing side was holding up entry of the final decree, when 
he was aware or should have been aware that it was already entered. Stewart used his position as her 
attorney to coerce her to sleep with him through a pattern of lies and manipulation. 
Contrary to the analysis contained in Stewarts' memorandum, the court in D.D.Z. v 
Molerwav Freight Lines, Inc., 880 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1994), citing the Utah Supreme Court's 
decision in Matheson v Pearson, 619 P.2d 321 (Utah 1980) only recognized three elements necessary 
to establish a civil claim of assault and battery in Utah: 
"1) The defendant acted, intending to cause harmful or offensive contact with 
the plaintiff, or imminent apprehension of such contact; 2) as a result, the 
plaintiff was thereby put in imminent apprehension of harm or contact; 3) the 
plaintiff suffered injuries proximately caused by the defendant's actions." Id. 
at 2-3. 
Stewarts' memorandum goes on to argue a fourth requirement not recognized by the court in 
D.D.Z., that the Defendant's acts resulted in an unpermitted touching of the Plaintiff. Stewart goes on 
to claim that because Walter "cannot establish an intent to harm or a lack of consent, Count I must fail 
as a matter of law." The question of whether Walter can establish an intent to harm is factual in 
nature, as is the question of consent. However, under the D.D.Z. analysis, lack of consent is not a 
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prerequisite of civil assault and battery. Under the standard of review applicable to Stewarts' motion, 
factual issues must be viewed in a light most favorable to Walter. Further, the D.D.Z., court also 
stated, "Because the elements of assault and battery require an "actor," the analysis should first focus 
on whether [the defendant] was the requisite actor. If he was an actor in [the] episode, then his intent 
could be inferred from his actions." Id. at 3. 
Walter's complaint alleges that Alan Stewart touched her without her consent and that he did 
so with intent to harm. By her complaint and affidavit supporting this memorandum (assuming her 
allegations to be true) Walter provides an ample factual basis for finding that Stewart committed 
battery. Even if consent were to become an issue in this case, Walter's complaint and 
affidavit establish, for purposes of this court's review of Stewarts' motion, under the entirety of the 
circumstances Walter did not consent to a sexual relationship with Alan Stewart. 
The trial court stated in its one paragraph opinion that "Count I, civil battery may have merit, 
but is barred by the one year statute of limitations. Plaintiff testified in her affidavit, that the 
Defendant physically touched her on numerous occasions throughout the year 2000. Plaintiffs 
complaint was filed on February 2, of 2001. Additionally, Plaintiffs affidavit states that Defendant 
represented her at a hearing to change her name on November 2,2000. After the hearing, Defendant 
grabbed the plaintiff around her waist (a harmful or offensive touching without her consent) and asked 
her to have sex with him. This incident alone contains all the elements of battery and occurred three 
months prior to when the Plaintiff filed her lawsuit. Thus, the trial court's finding on this point 
was clearly erroneous and its order should be reversed. 
B. NEGLIGENCE OR RECKLESS MISCONDUCT 
As noted in Stewart's memorandum, the elements of a cause of action for negligence are duty, 
breach of duty, causation, and damages. Gerbich v. Numed Inc., 977 P.2d 1205,1207 (Utah 1999). 
Contrary to the assertions contained in Stewarts' memorandum, the allegations and evidence 
presented in Walter's complaint and affidavit are sufficient to meet all four of the requirements to 
sustain her action for negligence. 
Duty 
First, with regard to Stewarts' duty to Walter as her attorney, Alan Stewart owed her the duty 
to conform to the standard of care of a reasonable and prudent attorney. Importantly, the Utah Rules 
of Professional Conduct prohibit an attorney from having sexual relations with a client. Chapter 13, 
Rule 8.4(g) (2000): 
"It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to...(g) Engage in sexual relations 
with a client that exploits the lawyer-client relationship:...(2) Except for a 
spousal relationship or a sexual relationship that existed at the commencement 
of the lawyer-client relationship, sexual relations between a lawyer and a client 
shall be presumed to be exploitive." 
This rule establishes the duty of care a lawyer owes his client. Walter's complaint alleges that Stewart 
was her attorney when he commenced pursuit of an intimate physical relationship with Walter. For 
example, Defendant called Plaintiff in April of 1999 and told her that "as long as she was his client, 
he had an excuse to call her; and that on April 15,2000, Defendant called Plaintiff and said: "if you 
move to Maryland, how are we supposed to have a relationship?" Affidavit of Beth Walter, p. 3-4. If 
these allegations do not clearly establish an attorney client relationship, they at least created a material 
issue of fact which would defeat summary judgment. 
If the behavior at issue in this case had occurred in an employment context, it would no 
doubt be actionable as sexual harassment under TITLE VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Why 
should this behavior go unpunished, when it occurs in an attorney's office but actionable in an 
employment context. Arguably, an attorney as fiduciary owes a higher duty to his client than an 
employer owes to his employee. 
Breach 
The next question to address is whether Stewart breached his duty to Walter. Walter argues 
that Alan Stewart initiated a sexual relationship with her while he was still her attorney, that he 
sexually preyed on her, that he harassed and abused her during the course of his representation, that he 
used his position as her attorney to withhold pertinent information regarding the status of her case, in 
order to further his own interests and that he deliberately mislead Walter to keep her from moving to 
Maryland. Taken as true under the standard of review applicable to Stewarts' motion, Walter's 
unrefuted facts and allegations are more than sufficient to establish that Stewarts breached the duty of 
care owed to Walter. Indeed, Stewart's behavior as alleged in the complaint, amounts to recklessness. 
In Matheson v Pearson, Supra at 322, 323, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"...reckless misconduct results when a person with no intent to cause harm, 
intentionally performs an act so unreasonable and dangerous that he knows or 
should know, it is highly probable that harm will result...It is the absence of 
intent to harm which renders reckless misconduct or reckless disregard of safety 
a form of negligence." 
The Defendant has admitted that he had a sexual relationship with the Plaintiff, but disputed 
the allegation that Plaintiff was his client when the relationship occurred. Again, this dispute 
of fact is sufficient to defeat summary judgment. 
Causation 
Generally, causation "cannot be resolved as a matter of law." Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 
97, 106 (Utah 1992). "Proximate cause is an issue of fact. Thus, only if there is no evidence upon 
which a reasonable jury could infer causation, is summary judgment appropriate." Harline v. Barker, 
854 P.2d 595,600 (Utah App.) (citations omitted), cert, denied, 862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993). In other 
words, Utah litigants do not easily dispose of the element of causation on summary judgment. 
Kilpatrick v. Wiley, at 1293. 
Walter's complaint specifically alleges that Stewarts' conduct was the direct and proximate 
cause of her injuries, which include: Walter became mentally distraught; she suffered enormous 
psychic pain; she became incapacitated emotionally to a nearly irreversible extent; and she required 
psychological treatment as a direct result of Stewarts' actions. Stewart has not rebutted these 
allegations, and even if he had submitted some evidence contradicting these allegations, the result 
would be a dispute about a material issue of fact. Again, either standard of review, Walter's 
allegations support an inference of causation sufficient to defeat summary judgment. 
Damages 
Finally, a plaintiff must establish damages to recover under a negligence theory. And once 
more, the question of damages is factual in nature. Accordingly, Walter alleges that she incurred 
numerous significant damages as direct and proximate result of Stewarts' negligent or reckless 
misconduct. In addition to emotional pain and suffering, Walter has incurred monetary damages as a 
result of her need for medical and psychological therapy. Taken as true, the allegations and facts set 
forth in Walter's complaint and affidavit are sufficient to establish a prima facie claim of negligence. 
Each element has been specifically pled, and has not been refuted by the Defendant. Thus, summary 
judgment on the negligence claim should be denied. 
C. BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 
Breach of fiduciary duty provides a basis for legal malpractice separate and apart from 
professional negligence. Kilpatrick v. Wiley, (supra) at 1293. In Kilpatrick, supra at 1290, the court 
outlined these elements: "1) an attorney - client relationship; 2) breach of the attorney's fiduciary duty 
to the client; 3) causation, both actual and proximate; and 4) damages suffered by the client." 
Each of these elements identified under Kilpatrick are factual in nature. In particular, the 
Kilpatrick court went to great pains to point out: 
"Causation is a highly fact-sensitive element of any cause of action. In Utah 
"[pjroximate causation is '[t]hat cause which in natural and continuous 
sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and 
without which the result would not have occurred.'"....Utah courts have 
recognized that "[f]act sensitive cases...do not lend themselves to a 
determination on summary judgment."" Id at 1292. 
Walter has provided evidence and alleged facts which, for purposes of reviewing Stewarts' 
motion, must be accepted as true and in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. The evidence and 
allegations applicable to Walter's cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty are: 1) that there existed 
between Walter and Stewarts an attorney - client relationship; 2) that Stewarts breached the fiduciary 
duty it owed Walter, when prior to termination of the attorney - client relationship, Alan Stewart, 
strictly for his own gratification, coerced Walter into a sexual relationship through lies, deceit and 
misrepresentations and that he otherwise violated the duty of care he owed his client; 3) that Stewart's 
conduct was the direct and proximate cause of injury to Walter. Had Alan Stewart held himself to 
ordinary standards of professional competence and refrained from using his position as a trusted 
fiduciary advisor to coerce Walter into a sexual relationship, Walter would not have suffered the 
injuries set forth in her complaint; and 4) that the injuries to Walter included physical, emotional, and 
monetary damages. 
"Courts throughout the United States have not hesitated to impose civil sanctions upon 
attorneys who breach their fiduciary duties to their clients, which sanctions have been imposed 
separately and apart from professional discipline." Kilpatrick v. Wiley at 1293 citing Maritrans 
GP Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 529 Pa. 241, 602 A.2d 1277,1286 (Pa. 1992). Such 
actions are grounded on the fundamental principle that attorneys must be completely loyal to their 
clients and must never use their position of trust to take advantage of client confidences for 
themselves or for other parties. Margulies ex rel. Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195,1204 
(Utah 1985). A breach of fiduciary duty by an attorney is actionable whether it involves 
financial claims or physical damage resulting from the violation. Barbara A. v. John G. 
(1983) 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 383 (emphasis added.) 
Analysis of causation and damages under this claim would be similar that of negligence as 
discussed above under negligence. In addition, analysis of the fraud claims, infra, is also relevant 
to analysis of whether Defendant breached his fiduciary duty to the Plaintiff. 
D. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
To recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress a plaintiff must show: (1) that 
defendant's conduct was outrageous and intolerable in that it offended against the generally 
accepted standards of decency and morality (2) intention to cause or reckless disregard of the 
probability of causing emotional distress, (3) severe emotional suffering and (4) actual and 
proximate causation of the emotional distress. Retherford v. At&T Communications of Mt. 
States, Inc. 844 p. 2d 949 (Utah 1992) see also Samms v. Eccles 358 P.2d 344 (1961). 
Perhaps the most difficult element for Plaintiff to prove is that the conduct is so extreme 
and outrageous as to offend all notions of common decency. The Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct provide specific guidance on what notions of common decency are in the context of an 
attorney-client relationship: Sexual relations between a lawyer and a client shall be presumed 
to be exploitative. Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 8.4 (g) (2000) (emphasis 
added). 
In McDaniel v. Gile a California court held that an attorney who engaged in a sexual 
relationship with his client in the midst of a dissolution proceeding has satisfied the requirement 
that the conduct be outrageous: 
Defendant had a special relationship with plaintiff in that she was a client and plaintiff was 
her attorney representing her in a dissolution of marriage proceeding. Plaintiff was in a 
position of actual or apparent power over defendant. Defendant was peculiarly susceptible 
to emotional distress because of her pending marital dissolution. Plaintiff was aware of 
defendant's circumstances. The withholding by a retained attorney of legal services when 
sexual favors are not granted by a client and engaging in sexual harassment of the client 
constitute acts of outrageous conduct under these circumstances. McDaniel v. Gile (supra). 
Defendant will no doubt attempt to distinguish this case from McDaniel because plaintiff 
has not alleged that defendant conditioned his representation of the Plaintiff on sexual favors. 
However, defendant did represent the plaintiff in a show cause hearing for no charge and later 
after he represented her in a motion to change her name he grabbed her around the waist and 
asked her to have sex with him. Again, whether defendant's conduct can be construed as 
suggesting a quid pro quo is a question of fact. 
In DiSandro, a case in which the plaintiff alleged intentional infliction of emotional 
distress resulting from a sexual relationship with her attorney during the course of dissolution 
proceedings, the court similarly recognized that a sexual relationship between an attorney and his 
client satisfied the outrageous and offensive requirement of the tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress: "had there been any competent medical evidence to establish the required 
causal connection between Vallinotofs alleged shingles and DiSandrofs conduct, we would not 
hesitate to uphold the trial justice's submission of the intentional infliction of emotional distress 
count to the jury." Maria Del Rosario Vallino v. Edmond A. DiSandro et al. RI.35 (1997). 
Defendant may attempt to use this case to argue that that the plaintiff has not shown competent 
medical evidence of emotional distress. However, the Plaintiff has alleged that she suffered 
emotional damage including humiliation and depression and is undergoing treatment with a 
licensed psychologist to deal with the damage caused the Defendant. Viewed in the light most 
favorable to her, those allegations are sufficient to defeat summary judgment. 
The second element of this tort is intention or reckless disregard of the probability of 
causing emotional distress. While defendant Stewart probably did not intend to cause emotional 
distress to Walter, he should have known that engaging in a sexual relationship with a vulnerable 
client would result in emotional trauma to her, especially because he had to lie to her in order to 
get her to have sex with him. Even if he had intended to marry the plaintiff, Stewart should have 
realized that the plaintiff would suffer greatly when she found out that he was already married. 
The question of whether his conduct was reckless is a question of fact and not appropriate for 
resolution on a motion for summary judgment. 
The other elements of this tort, causation and damages, are identical to those discussed 
above in the discussion of negligence and the same analysis applies here. In sum, plaintiff has 
alleged all the elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress and those 
elements are supported by the plaintiffs complaint and affidavit. When viewed in the light most 
favorable to the Plaintiff, they are sufficient to support a cause of action on this claim. 
E. FRAUD 
As noted by Stewart in his memorandum, to maintain an action for fraud, Walter must show: 
"by clear and convincing evidence... 1) that a representation was made; 2) 
concerning a presently existing material fact; 3) which was false; 4) which the 
one making the misrepresentation either a) knew to be false, or b) made 
recklessly knowing he had insufficient knowledge upon which to base such 
representation; 5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it; 6) 
that the other party acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; 7) did in 
fact rely upon it; 8) and was thereby induced to act; 9) to its injury and damage/' 
Cheever v. Schramm, 577 P.2d 951, 954 (Utah 1978). 
By definition under Cheever, the question of whether Walter has met the burden of proving 
fraud is a factual determination. Accordingly, under the standard of review applicable to Stewarts' 
motion, the allegations and evidence presented by Walter must be analyzed in a light most favorable 
to her claims. The elements of fraud are set forth in the Plaintiffs complaint and affidavit as follows. 
Element 1 (representation): Alan Stewart made representations to the Plaintiff, including 
but not limited to representing: that her divorce action was not final, when in fact it was; that if Walter 
moved to Maryland she would have to return to Utah to finalize her divorce; that he was not married, 
when in fact he was married for over 20 years; that he was desirous of a committed, monogamous 
relationship with Walter, when in fact he was a married father of five children. 
Element 2 ( material fact): The representations made by Alan Stewart were material. On 
numerous occasions Walter informed him that she wanted to know if her divorce was final so that she 
could move to Maryland with her affairs in Utah settled. When Alan Stewart coerced Walter into a 
sexual relationship, she repeatedly emphasized that she expected their relationship to be monogamous 
and Alan Stewart agreed that it would. Further, Walter made numerous inquiries regarding Alan 
Stewart's marital status and he repeatedly assured her that he was divorced. 
Elements 3 and 4 (falsity and knowledge): The representations made by Alan Stewart were 
false and Alan Stewart knew them to be false. Stewarts' memorandum emphasizes that Walter's 
divorce was finalized when the stipulation was signed by the parties in February 1999. However, 
Alan Stewart, in his capacity as Walter's attorney, repeatedly advised Walter that her divorce was not 
final, even after the divorce decree had been entered by the court in April 1999. Further, Alan Stewart 
lied to Walter about his marital status and relationship with his wife and he did so knowing that 
Walter was relying on his lies in making decisions regarding relocating to Maryland and becoming 
involved in a sexual relationship with him. 
Element 5 (inducement): Fully aware of Walter's emotional vulnerability and using his 
influence and position as her trusted legal advisor for his own sexual gratification, Alan Stewart 
repeatedly lied to Walter and misrepresented the status of her legal affairs for the purpose of coercing 
Walter into a sexual relationship. 
Element 6 (reasonableness): On the other hand, Walter took every reasonable precaution 
necessary to protect her interests. As her attorney, it is inconceivable that Alan Stewart now argues 
Walter was not entitled to rely on his expertise in assessing her legal obligations or otherwise trust 
him. The very essence of the attorney - client relationship is trust and over the course representing her 
during the divorce, Walter grew to trust Alan Stewart as trusted legal advisor and friend. There was 
simply no basis in their relationship for inferring that Alan Stewart was anything other than what he 
purported to be. Further, in terms of inquiring regarding Alan Stewart's marital status, Walter 
undertook reasonable investigatory steps. Alan Stewart did not wear a wedding ring; while he kept 
pictures of children in his office, he did not have a picture of his wife; he introduced Walter as his 
girlfriend to his associates; he took Walter to public places and on business trips; and most 
importantly he spent a considerable amount of time with Walter including afternoons, evenings, 
important holidays, and weekends. 
Elements 7 and 8 (reliance and inducement): Walter relied on Alan Stewart's 
misrepresentation and lies. At his behest and urging, she canceled her relocation to Maryland and 
agreed to enter into a committed, monogamous sexual relationship with him. 
Element 9 (injury): As a result of the fraud perpetrated on her by Stewarts, Walter suffered 
physical, mental emotional and monetary damages. 
Under the applicable standard of review the allegations and evidence presented by Walter, 
under her cause of action for fraud, provide sufficient grounds to deny Stewarts' motion. Again, 
many of the elements of a fraud claim are factual in nature and are disputed by the parties. Thus 
Defendant's motion should be denied. 
F. BREACH OF CONTRACT 
Under a case previously cited, the Utah Court of Appeals recognized, 
"[L]egal malpractice is a generic term for at least three distinct causes of action 
available to clients who suffer damages because of their lawyers' misbehavior. 
Clients wronged by their lawyers may sue for damages based on breach of 
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, or negligence....Regardless of whether the 
cause of action is based on negligence, breach of contract, or breach of fiduciary 
duty, the central purpose of the law of legal malpractice is to guard against and 
to remedy exploitation of the power lawyers possess over their clients' lives and 
property." Kilpatrick v. Wiley, 909 P.2d 1283,1289 (Utah App. 1996). 
Under Utah law, all contracts whether express or implied, includes a variety of covenants as set forth 
in Plaintiffs sixth cause of action including, but not limited to, covenants of good faith and fair 
dealing. 
Plaintiff has alleged that Alan Stewart breached these covenants by using his position as 
Walter's trusted legal advisor to exploit her for his own sexual gratification. Under the court's 
analysis in Kilpatrick, Walter is entitled to plead and develop evidence through the discovery process, 
based on an alternative cause of action grounded on breach of contract. In order to evaluate that 
claim, a finder of fact would be required to determine whether a contract existed, what the terms and 
implied covenants of that were and whether they were breached. These are all factual questions, 
incapable of resolution on a motion for summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has alleged all the elements of her various claims against the Defendant, and has 
supported those allegations with facts in her complaint and affidavit. Since defendant has 
disputed these factual matters, summary judgment should be denied. Plaintiff urges this court to 
find that an attorney who engages in a sexual relationship with his client in the course of 
representation, or at least in the course of representation in a divorce proceeding, has breached 
fiduciary duties and engaged in negligent and outrageous conduct as a matter of law. If the court 
elects not to so find, it should still allow plaintiffs claims of battery, fraud, and breach of contract 
to be presented to the finder of fact. 
DATED this _ 2 _ day of March, 2002. 
WINGO & RINEHART 
T ^ W ^ ^ t ^ K ^ O 
Kathleen McConkie 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 
2 HONORABLE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD PRESIDING 
3 P R O C E E D I N G S 
4 THE COURT: Ready? 
5 MS. MCCONKIE: We are, your Honor, Kathleen McKonkie 
6 on behalf of the plaintiff. 
7 MR. SKEEN: Randall Skeen on behalf of the defendant. 
8 MS. MCCONKIE: Plaintiff is present before you. 
9 THE COURT: Let's go ahead with the argument, Mr. 
10 Skeen. I am treating it as a motion for summary judgment. 
11 MR. SKEEN: Okay. I was wondering which way we were 
12 going to go on that. 
13 THE COURT: Well, by the time you both filed 
14 affidavits you'd taken it pretty much out of the world of a 
15 motion to dismiss. 
16 MR. SKEEN: I think that's correct. 
17 THE COURT: The response to the Reply Memorandum is 
18 also stricken. 
19 MR. SKEEN: Thank you. Your Honor, basically, as the 
20 Court has obviously reviewed, and they're fairly lengthy 
21 pleadings and I think this is a, at least pleading wise, is a 
22 fairly confusing, fact intensive case. But basically where 
23 this case starts and ends is in a romantic relationship. 
24 That's what gives rise to all of the plaintiff's claims and 
25 really that's where this thing is going to start and stop. 
1 Basically - and actually I should inquire of the Court, I know 
2 counsel made a motion to file an amended complaint. I don't 
3 know that that was ever addressed. 
4 THE COURT: Oh, well, I granted the motion a long 
5 time ago and the amended complaint was filed and, frankly, it's 
6 as if all of your research was done in light of the first 
7 complaint because the amended complaint only has four causes of 
8 action. 
9 MR. SKEEN: That's correct. 
10 THE COURT: But that's what we're working off. 
11 MR. SKEEN: Okay. Well, I was uncertain as to 
12 whether or not that had been granted and so if I seem to divert 
13 over to some of the stricken causes, please advise me. 
14 But in any event, the plaintiff hired the defendant 
15 as an attorney back in I believe 1998. It was to handle a 
16 divorce which subsequently was settled by virtue of ei 
17 stipulation which was executed in February of 1999 and a 
18 divorce decree was entered in April of *99. Now, according to 
19 the allegations within the complaint, I believe the 
20 relationship commenced approximately two months after the 
21 decree was entered which would be in about June of 1999. 
22 THE COURT: But before, according to the plaintiff, 
23 the defendant told her the decree had been entered. 
24 MR. SKEEN: I don't, again, I'm not sure that that 
25 makes a heck of a lot of difference. We do know that the 
1 decree was entered. 
2 THE COURT: (Inaudible) 
3 MR. SKEEN: On April 26 of 1999. Subsequently there 
4 was an order to show cause that was filed in August of *99 
5 based upon her refusal to pay some financial obligations. That 
6 was resolved by virtue of her paying it. And then the last 
7 instance where any legal action was undertaken I believe was in 
8 November of 2000 in which a perfunctory name change was entered 
9 and it ended at that point. 
10 Now, as I looked at this complaint and, I guess even 
11 the amended complaint, many of the allegations, they seem to 
12 have tried to repackage some criminal allegations into civil 
13 causes of action, specifically some intentional torts. Now, 
14 generally, I'd like to address specifically basically, at least 
15 start with the battery. The concern and even in the amended 
16 complaint, we do not have allegations as to the specific dates 
17 and we know since the complaint was filed in February of 2001 
18 that anything prior to February of 2000 would be barred by the 
19 statute. 
20 But, notwithstanding that, and, again, I'll sort of 
21 defer back to our brief because on the battery issues we did, I 
22 think address those semi, semi well. In any event, she has 
23 failed in any sense to show that he intended any kind of 
24 intentional harm and her affidavit doesn't even really get to 
25 that point. He is alleged, I mean, again, if you look at this 
1 thing as what it really was which was nothing more than a 
2 romantic relationship, there was never intention, any 
3 intentional harm that could be shown. 
4 THE COURT: I don't know that you can say that when 
5 admittedly these are not unusual circumstances but she alleges 
6 that he lied to her about his marital relationship and nothing 
7 would have happened without. If that's true, maybe there 
8 wasn't intended harm but it would certainly fall into* the 
9 reckless category. 
10 MR. SKEEN: Well, may I approach? 
11 THE COURT: Sure. 
12 MR. SKEEN: Thank you. There was a case that came 
13 down subsequent to our filing this motion which is Sherman vs. 
14 Sherman. This is a case that involved factually similar 
15 circumstance to this case. It was Judge Dever's case and the 
16 Utah Supreme Court came down. Basically, in this case a 
17 patient sued her psychiatrist for intentional infliction of 
18 emotional distress and also for medical malpractice. Judge 
19 Dever entered or granted a motion for summary judgment on both 
20 counts. The medical malpractice, I don't know that that has 
21 much to do with this case because essentially they missed the 
22 statute on that but what's very interesting is on the 
23 intentional infliction of emotional distress damages, the Court 
24 upheld the motion for summary judgment and actually cited a 
25 number of cases and the restatement of torts and the Supreme 
Court in citing a prior case which is, I think, Sams vs. 
Eccles, indicated that the law only or will intervene only 
where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable 
person could be expected to endure it. That is the law. 
Now, factually, in this case, the allegations are 
very similar to that case. The psychiatrist had treated her 
for some 38 visits, stopped treating her, immediately 
thereafter entered into a romantic relationship* The plaintiff 
in that case alleged that the psychiatrist had promised to 
marry her. He promised to take case of her, made a number of 
admittedly misrepresentations and she alleged that there had 
been a transference. That as a result of his acts she had 
become, her affections were transferred from her husband to him 
which resulted in a divorce. She then went into what she 
alleged as very heavy-duty counseling. 
And the court very simply said that however 
unpleasant the emotional distress that plaintiff alleges is 
indistinguishable from that commonly suffered by others in an 
intimate - when an intimate relationship fails. That, your 
Honor, is exactly what happened here. And although she may 
allege that she was harmed, she may allege that she's damaged, 
that she's had to have psycho-therapeutic services. None of 
this in indistinguishable from that which is suffered in other 
cases. Very simply put. Her own affidavit doesn't even, you 
know, go any farther than that. 
1 Now back, and I diverted just a little bit, but back 
2 to the Court's indication that she somehow could enter into a 
3 sexual relationship and then withdraw consent, that's addressed 
4 in a case right on point is the Neal case in which you've got a 
5 husband and wife situation where the wife says he promised to 
6 be faithful to me and, again, her affidavit says he promised to 
7 be faithful to me, he promised to enter into a monogamist 
8 relationship. Well, (inaudible) said that has nothing to do, 
9 you can't retroactively come back and say I was defrauded into 
10 entering into a sexual relationship. Again, that's exactly 
11 what we have here and by virtue of that, that not only kills 
12 the fraud aspects that she's alleged, it also takes out the 
13 intentional infliction of emotional distress. She cannot 
14 withdraw consent. It also spills over into the battery claims 
15 because the touching has to be un-consented to essentially 
16 unwarranted. She consented to it. It was an ongoing 
17 consensual relationship until she discovered that in fact this 
18 gentleman was married. 
19 And for the purpose of this hearing, your Honor, 
20 we're not going to concede that he represented to her that he 
21 wasn't married. We're not. We don't concede that and the 
22 evidence will come out. 
23 But what's really interesting as well is one of the 
24 other elements, particularly in the fraud aspect, is reliance. 
25 She has to reasonably rely. Well, your Honor, she called his 
1 wife. She called his wife and told his wife that there was a 
2 relationship going on which resulted in the defendant' s 
3 divorce. You cannot have reasonable reliance, ignorantly put 
4 on blinders and then after the fact she knew. I mean she 
5 obviously was suspicious enough that she called his home. So, 
6 that kills the reliance aspect as well. 
7 With respect to the legal malpractice claims, in 
8 fact, actually just the general negligence claims first because 
9 I think those have still been alleged. But as I read the 
10 complaint, somehow plaintiff is trying to alleged that if 
11 intentional torts fail then negligence, some kind of general 
12 negligence is going to apply. Well, first of all, it hasn't 
13 been plead with any kind of particularity that would apply but 
14 secondly, there is no catch all negligence standard that is 
15 going to grab any failed intentional acts. 
16 Now, I know as lawyers with alternative pleading, we 
17 allege that all the time. We allege somebody defrauded us and 
18 if he didn't defraud us then he was negligent in taking our 
19 money. But there just isn't a catch all that applies. It 
20 hasn't been properly plead. The elements haven't been properly 
21 eluded or substantiated by her affidavit. 
22 Now, with regard to the professional negligence 
23 claims, she states there is a duty but I don't see how there 
24 could be a breach. 
25 THE COURT: Are you talking about the fiduciary duty? 
MR. SKEEN: Yeah. Well, no. Let's talk first about 
that it's just a simple legal malpractice claim and then I'll 
get to the breach of fiduciary duty. 
THE COURT: I don't think we really have one of those 
in the amended complaint. 
MR. SKEEN: Oh, did you take that out? I'm sorry. 
I'm sorry, I -
THE COURT: But that was -
MS. MCCONKIE: No, we're talking about malpractice. 
We're talking about breach of contract which is -
THE COURT: Right. 
MS. MCCONKIE: Breach of fiduciary duty. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. 
MR. SKEEN: Well, first of all she's got to allege 
there is a fiduciary duty which could be breached and I guess 
in the context of it we need to look at what duty was there. 
Well, there is a duty of honesty, a duty to handle her case 
well, a duty to act, work in a workman-like manner. She hired 
him to do a divorce which resulted in a stipulated default 
settlement. Whether he is a good guy or a bad guy, it resulted 
in a stipulated settlement of the divorce. 
The second order to show cause, he's a good guy, he's 
a bad guy, it was settled by virtue of her paying the money she 
was ordered to under the Decree of Divorce. And as I've 
indicated, she's never alleged that he violated the trust and 
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1 therefore she got a bad deal on her divorce. None of that has 
2 ever happened. 
3 And then the third instance of representation is a 
4 simple fairly perfunctory name change where she wanted, I 
5 understand, to revert to her maiden name. That was 
6 accomplished. If he's a good guy or a bad guy, if he's having 
7 a sexual relationship or he's not, it was entered. There can't 
8 be any professional malpractice here because she can't allege a 
9 breach of his duty which results in any kind of damages. It 
10 falls back again to this catch-all let's throw in some kind of 
11 negligence because he lied to me about whether or not he was 
12 married. And as such, you know, if he has a duty to be honest 
13 with her and we do as lawyers, I don't know that we have a duty 
14 as lawyers to be honest about our personal lives where it 
15 doesn't affect the underlying attorney/client relationship. I 
16 mean she doesn't allege and she can't prove that, hey, because 
17 we were having a relationship he did a real bad job on my case. 
18 Because we were having a relationship, I would have hired 
19 somebody else that would have done a much better job. It's not 
20 there or any damages and, therefore, those causes of action 
21 must fail as well. 
22 The breach of fiduciary duty, and I'm assuming they 
23 still have that. 
24 THE COURT: Yes. 
25 MR. SKEEN: Again, what fiduciary duty was breached? 
1 What is owed first of all. He didnft control or handle any of 
2 her money or property. What possible fiduciary relationship 
3 did he, was entered into and did he owe her a duty upon? And I 
4 guess I don't understand it. I don't understand it from the 
5 pleadings. I don't understand it from the opposition. I don't 
6 understand it from the affidavits. I don't understand what 
7 possible fiduciary duty there could have been. 
8 Now, the Kilpatrick case was really interesting in 
9 that it held that breach of professional conduct does not give 
10 rise to a breach of fiduciary duty. I quote: 
11 "The rules of professional conduct are not 
12 a basis for civil liability." 
13 And I think that's what we're talking about here. If he 
14 entered into this relationship with her and obtained her house 
15 or her bank account or something of value and then stole it, 
16 wasted it, misappropriated it then, yeah, we're here likely or 
17 at least arguably for a claim of breach of fiduciary duty. But 
18 it's just simply not there. 
19 Also, the Clean case which was the plaintiff's own 
20 case, states that a breach occurs only, only if the legal 
21 services are contingent upon sexual involvement. They weren't 
22 because remember the divorce is entered. They enter into the 
23 relationship, there is an enforcement issue and a name change 
24 but he didn't say and she didn't allege and hasn't stated in 
25 J her affidavit that, hey, you wouldn't have done this name 
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1 change except that Ifm having a relationship with you. So, she 
2 fails there. 
3 Secondly, that somehow he compromised the client's 
4 legal interest by virtue of a relationship. I donft know how 
5 that could be. It was an enforcement issue. She paid the 
6 money and that's it. He did the name change and that's it. So 
7 there was no compromise there at all. 
8 And then, finally, that he used, somehow used 
9 personal information to seduce. Well, remember there's not a 
10 relationship when this - or there is not a or there is not a 
11 legal attorney/client ongoing relationship when he enters into 
12 the relationship with her. And what's born out by that is the 
13 fact that when she was served with the order to show cause on 
14 the enforcement issues, it wasn't served to him as her lawyer, 
15 it was served on her personally and then she engaged him and 
16 asked him to do it. 
17 But, again, none of these things fit, Judge. She 
18 hasn't been able to demonstrate anything more than akin to 
19 somebody that goes into a bar without a wedding ring and tells 
20 a woman he's not married and away they go. And, therefore, 
21 there is just no basis and we believe that summary judgment 
22 should be granted in all causes. 
23 THE COURT: That you, Mr. Skeen. 
24 Ms. McConkie? 
25 MS. MCCONKIE: Thank you, your Honor. Your Honor, we 
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1 do agree with one thing counsel stated. This is a very fact 
2 intensive case and we agree that the Courtfs going to - in 
3 order to determine some of these the Court is going to have to 
4 review the facts. 
5 Now, the defendants have alleged that there are no 
6 indisputable facts but there are some indisputable facts and I 
7 think some of the undisputable facts are a key to whether a 
8 summary judgment motion should be granted or not. First of 
9 all, they allege that the matter was settled on the 18th of 
10 February, 1999. That was when the stipulation was signed. At 
11 that time there was no divorce entered. Anyone who has even 
12 done divorce work knows that there are other pleadings that 
13 need to be entered and submitted to the clerk, records and to 
14 the judge and executed before a divorce can be finalized. And, 
15 in fact, a divorce was not finalized until the 26th of April. 
16 Another thing the Court needs to understand I think 
17 and clearly understand is that even after the divorce was done 
18 my client had been talking to Mr. Stewart regarding an adoption 
19 and he had agreed that he would handle the Utah portion of the 
20 adoption even though the adoption hadn't -
21 THE COURT: This isn't in her affidavit, is it? 
22 MS. MCCONKIE: Well, she, I believe it is, your 
23 Honor. She talked about the adoption in her affidavit. 
24 THE COURT: I don't believe she did. 
25 MS. MCCONKIE: (Inaudible) 
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1 THE COURT: She didn't- I want to hear about it. 
2 MS. MCCONKIE: I'll have my client look through her 
3 affidavit, your Honor, and maybe I can continue and she could 
4 find it for me. 
5 And, your Honor, and he agreed to do the Utah portion 
6 of that adoption. 
7 Additionally, your Honor, there is a difference in 
8 terms of the facts in terms of when the relationship started. 
9 The divorce was finalized on the 26th of April, 1999, and, if 
10 you read the affidavit of the plaintiff you will see that they 
11 did start to date. They didn't have a sexual relationship 
12 prior to June, excuse me, July 1999, but they started to date 
13 where he called her, he took her out and that is - so in terms 
14 of the relationship when did the romantic relationship start? 
15 It started prior to the time the divorce was finalized. 
16 Additionally, your Honor, Mr. Stewart never filed a 
17 withdrawal of counsel. He never withdrew from being her 
18 attorney and as exemplified there were other post-divorce 
19 actions that occurred and he was there and handled those for 
20 her as well as the adoption and the name change. 
21 So, we have some very important disputable facts. 
22 Mr. Stewart alleges in his facts that he terminated the 
23 relationship with Walter. That is also disputed by number 10 
24 in Walter's memorandum. He represented that when he started 
25 the probate matter that the relationship had been terminated at 
13 
1 that point and that is also disputed. Your Honor, there are, 
2 this is a fact intensive situation and really the Court will 
3 need to have evidence in terms of the facts to determine which 
4 facts, in fact, are correct. 
5 THE COURT: Have you done any discovery? 
6 MS. MCCONKIE: No, your Honor, we've done nothing as 
7 of yet. We have, we have prepared some interrogatories but we 
8 received the motion for summary judgment fairly early on and we 
9 are now just having it heard. The matter was initially before 
10 Judge Frederick who recused himself because he had a conflict 
11 (inaudible) we're here. We haven't actually, you know, had our 
12 discovery served (inaudible). And it is our opinion, your 
13 Honor, that Walter is entitled to her day in Court and an 
14 opportunity to gather the evidence to support the allegations 
15 of her complaint and she also, and, as the Court understands 
16 and realizes, that she has a right to do that. 
17 (Both talking) 
18 THE COURT: But you've had several months to have 
19 started that. 
20 MS. MCCONKIE: (Inaudible) Pardon me? 
21 THE COURT: One of you initial responses to this 
22 motion was we need to do discovery so we can get some facts out 
23 at least with specific causes of action in mind. 
24 MS. MCCONKIE: That's right, your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: And you haven't started. You've had 
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1 months -
2 MS. MCCONKIE: Well, no. 
3 THE COURT: - to get started. 
4 MS. MCCONKIE: No, your Honor, we have started our 
5 discovery. We haven't served it but we thought we would go 
6 through this summary judgment motion before we did. And the 
7 summary judgment motion has taken quite a long time to get 
8 scheduled so we have, I will proffer to the Court that we have 
9 started discovery. 
10 THE COURT: You should have had it served months ago, 
11 MS. MCCONKIE: Your Honor, in terms of the battery 
12 claim, the claim that Alan Stewart did not intend to harm 
13 Walter and that Walter consent to Alan Stewart's advances to 
14 her, I think the issue there, the important issue, is whether 
15 Alan Stewart acted in a manner which he knew or should have 
16 known would result in harmful or offensive contact with Walter. 
17 And, frankly, he knew that. He was in a, he used his fiduciary 
18 position to manipulate and disarm Walter and now he asks the 
19 Court to shield him from the consequences of his actions. In 
20 her complaint Walter alleges in paragraph 23 that due to her 
21 state of mind and emotional condition she was legally incapable 
22 of consenting to a sexual relationship with Alan Stewart and 
23 even if for purposes of argument she did consent, Alan Stewart 
24 engaged in a pattern of fraud and deception for the sole 
25 purpose of which was to prevent Walter from making an informed 
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1 decision. There was no informed consent regarding their 
2 relationship. 
3 And in terms of whether he had the intent for harm in 
4 terms of the battery claim or whether she consented, those are 
5 also fact intensive. Those are issues which need to be, need 
6 to have evidence and to be determine, and the Court needs to 
7 determine what happened there. 
8 Now, we did, we did use the Neal case in our 
9 memorandum and although Neal involves an Idaho Court's 
10 interpretation of the law and it is distinguishable on the 
11 basis that Alan Stewart and Walter discussed the marital 
12 relationship and discussed these things before entering into a 
13 sexual relationship. It was only after that Alan Stewart lied 
14 to Walter regarding the status of her divorce and his marriage 
15 that she consented to the relationship and he knew that if he 
16 was successful in lying to Walter and in deceiving her, she 
17 would not have sex with him - if he were not successful she 
18 would not have sex with him. So, the alleged consent should 
19 not be at issue in Alan Stewart's and should not be tied to 
20 Alan Stewart's intent and the sole question before the Court 
21 would be whether Walter, whether Walter has alleged and 
22 supported facts sufficient for the Court to find that Stewart's 
23 acts had acted with the intent to harm or in a manner which 
24 Stewart should have known would result in harmful contact with 
25 I Walter. 
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1 THE COURT: What about the statute of limitations 
2 argument on the battery claim? 
3 MS. MCCONKIE: In terms of the battery claim, your 
4 Honor, I don't know if we actually - I believe, your Honor, 
5 that we claimed that this was a civil intentional tort so there 
6 was not a problem with the statute of limitations. 
7 THE COURT: The defendant alleges that it's a one 
8 year statute of limitations in his memorandum. 
9 MS. MCCONKIE: Well, we claim that, we claimed it as 
10 an intent civil, that it was an intentional (inaudible), that's 
11 what we, that was our response at that time. 
12 In terms of the fiduciary duty, paragraph 18 of the 
13 complaint alleges that Alan Stewart used his position of 
14 authority and influence and power as a lawyer to sexually 
15 pursue, harass, to dominate, abuse and take advantage of 
16 Walter. The idea here, your Honor, is that Alan Stewart 
17 compromised her legal interest in that he obtained confidential 
18 information from Walter regarding her mental and emotional 
19 status through his capacity as her trusted legal advisor and he 
20 used this information in breach of his fiduciary duty to 
21 satisfy himself. So he used the information that he received 
22 as her lawyer to damage her. 
23 With respect to the fraud claim, the purposes of, one 
24 of the purposes of Walter's affidavit are to present evidence 
25 that; one, she acted reasonably in relying on the 
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1 representations of Alan Stewart; and two, that she suffered 
2 damages. And with regard to the issue of reliance, both the 
3 Court of Appeals and the Utah Supreme Court have recognized the 
4 principle that a plaintiff may justifiably rely on positive 
5 assertions of fact without independent investigation. 
6 THE COURT: Well, I donft think that's an issue. I 
7 think you're probably on solid ground on the reliance issues. 
8 The damage issue is where you have a little more work to do. 
9 MS. MCCONKIE: In terms of the fraud issue - in terms 
10 of the statute of frauds, I would like to say that we -
11 THE COURT: No. You're in good shape on that 
12 argument, too. 
13 MS. MCCONKIE: Okay. 
14 THE COURT: There wasn't a promise to marry as far as 
15 I can tell in anybody's allegations so I don't think the 
16 statute of fraud applies. 
17 MS. MCCONKIE: I thought I'd just mention it in case 
18 the Court wanted (inaudible). 
19 THE COURT: Yeah. 
20 MS. MCCONKIE: Also, your Honor, we believe that she 
21 has a separate claim for breach of contract and this is also an 
22 action under the theory of legal malpractice. She signed a 
23 retainer agreement with him. There is disputed facts on if he 
24 intended to, if he still remained her lawyer during this period 
25 I of time. 
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1 THE COURT: That's not in your amended complaint 
2 though. The amended complaint is battery, intentional 
3 infliction of emotional distress -
4 MS. MCCONKIE: And fiduciary duty. That's where -
5 THE COURT: - negligence and breach of fiduciary 
6 duty. 
7 MS. MCCONKIE: That's right. 
8 THE COURT: And there is no question but that he had 
9 a fiduciary duty 
10 MS. MCCONKIE: (Inaudible) that's right, your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: - the question is whether or not there is 
12 a breach. 
13 MS. MCCONKIE: That's right. We went ahead and 
14 included it because it had been argued. 
15 Your Honor, it's not the purpose of a summary 
16 judgment procedure to judge the credibility of the averments 
17 of parties or witnesses. 
18 THE COURT: Yes, it is. When one party makes a 
19 properly supported motion for summary judgment, the other party 
20 has the obligation to come forward with factual information 
21 indicating that there's a legal basis for the claim. That's an 
22 absolute requirement in the response for a summary judgment 
23 motion. 
24 MS. MCCONKIE: That's correct, your Honor. What I'm 
25 doing is I'm quoting from Kilpatrick, the court in Kilpatrick 
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1 which talks about the fact for the weigh of evidence: 
2 "Neither is it to deny parties the right to 
3 a trial to resolve disputed issues of 
4 fact." 
5 We know here that there are disputed issues of fact. 
6 It's purpose to eliminate the time, trouble and expense of 
7 trial where upon new changes of the facts certify the party 
8 ruled against he would not be entitled to prevail. 
9 Now, your Honor, we have a situation here where 
10 opposing counsel and where Mr. Stewart has claimed that there 
11 was no intent to harm. That's a factual issue. We have a 
12 situation where we have a requisite actor and that intent to 
13 harm can be inferred from those actions. We have met the three 
14 elements of battery. We have a defendant who intend -
15 intending to cause harmful or offensive contact or eminent or 
16 apprehension of such contact. We know he did that and we know 
17 he had to lie to do that. And we also know that it put the 
18 plaintiff in eminent apprehension of harm and we know, and she 
19 has claimed that she has suffered serious harm. Intent to harm 
20 is factual in nature as is the question of consent. We have 
21 the requisite answer, requisite actor and then we need to look 
22 to his intent inferred from his actions. 
23 In terms of the causation factor, causation is a 
24 factual question as well. We allege that Stewart's conduct was 
25 a direct and proximate cause of injuries and that she suffered 
20 
enormous psychic pain when she'd been incapacitated emotionally 
and she has had to medical care because of that- And the Court 
needs to assume those allegations must be true and that's she 
met the threshold for the requirement of proving causation 
sufficient to overcome Stewart's notions. 
If we look at the Kilpatrick case, it talks 
particularly about causation. It says causation is a highly 
fact sensitive element in any cause of action. In Utah a 
proximate causation is that cause which in natural and 
continuous sequence unbroken by sufficient intervening cause 
produces injury. We have an attorney/client relationship. We 
have a breach of duty, of fiduciary duty, and we know that he 
breached his duty because we have an ethical standard which 
talks about not having a sexual relationship which is also 
discussed in brief in our brief and we have proximate cause for 
injury. 
One thing I think is really important that the Court 
remember is that no where in Mr. Stewart's affidavits or no 
where have they alleged that he filed a withdrawal of counsel. 
And he's continued to work on whatever cases she had as they 
went along. 
We also want to make it very clear that we dispute 
the facts that he ever withdrew and that the relationship, when 
the relationship started. I think that is central to this 
issue. 
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1 Your Honor, we have an individual who had a duty, a 
2 duty as an attorney who had personal information about his 
3 client and he used that personal information and lied to that 
4 client to receive a personal benefit and certainly if he did 
5 not know, he should have known that that behavior would cause 
6 her harm. 
7 THE COURT: Alright, Mr. Skeen? 
8 MR. SKEEN: Thank you, your Honor, just briefly. As 
9 the Court indicated once we filed a motion for summary judgment 
10 each and every element must be rebutted by competent evidence. 
11 The affidavits submitted are clearly lacking. With regard to 
12 any facts out there, counsel only eluded to three facts. 
13 Number one, when was the divorce entered? Was it in February, 
14 was it in April? It doesn't make any difference. It was in 
15 April. We don't, I mean that's not a fact in dispute and by 
16 their own allegations - well, let me move to the next one. 
17 The next one is when did the relationship start? 
18 Paragraph 37 indicates that the first kiss was June 5th. 
19 Clearly two months after entry of the divorce decree. And the 
20 first sexual relationship beyond that in paragraph 40 of her 
21 affidavit occurred on July 22nd. No dispute again there. We 
22 indicated that, I mean we'll go with their facts because I 
23 don' t believe they create any question of fact of which would 
24 defer entry of summary judgment. 
25 And the third fact was plaintiff says, well, who 
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1 terminated it? Did she terminate it? Did he terminate it? 
2 Again, it doesn't matter. Everybody agrees that as of a 
3 certain date it was terminated and there just aren't any 
4 questions of fact that are going to preclude entry of summary 
5 judgment. As the Court indicated, the law is clear. The 
6 statute of limitations, unintentional torts is one year and 
7 pursuant to our affidavits which have not been contradicted as 
8 far as dates, those claims, those intentional torts claims must 
9 go by virtue of the statute of limitations. 
10 With respect to the breach of fiduciary duty, 
11 plaintiff has indicated that somehow Mr. Stewart compromised 
12 her legal status but, again, I don't see that. There's no 
13 harm. There's no damages. And we've got to have damages 
14 follow. 
15 THE COURT: I don't see a breach in the fiduciary 
16 standard, meaning monetary. He was in a position of trust 
17 though and it does appear that he abused the position of trust 
18 to enter into an extra marital relationship that wouldn't have 
19 occurred if he hadn't lied to her about her marital status 
20 using the facts as they've alleged. 
21 MR. SKEEN: Well, if - again, your Honor, I don't 
22 know that the two are interconnected. I know the Court may be 
23 seeing it differently at this stage and I'll accept that but I 
24 don't see that his fiduciary relationship as her legal counsel 
25 somehow makes it intertwined that -
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1 THE COURT: No -
2 MR, SKEEN: Hefs somehow got to breach that 
3 relationship which leads to the sexual relationship and I don't 
4 see that. He didn't breach any fiduciary, legal fiduciary 
5 relationship. 
6 THE COURT: What I'm talking about with the position 
7 of trust I think has to go back to the battery claims, not the 
8 fiduciary duty claims. 
9 MR. SKEEN: No. Sure, yeah. Okay. 
10 And, finally, with respect to the intentional 
11 infliction, again there's - the Sherman case is very clear. 
12 Very recent. Three months old. A Utah Supreme Court case. 
13 Similar facts, and if you want to get a breach of fiduciary 
14 duty, there is a patient/doctor relationship and the Court said 
15 unless you can raise this level and show us that something 
16 gravely different from what normally follows in a broken 
17 relationship then we're not going to grant relief. And in that 
18 case she went farther than saying, hey, I had to go to a 
19 shrink. She says this broke up my marriage. I went to a 
20 shrink. I had transference of the relationship. We don't have 
21 any of that here. So, based upon that, your Honor, I believe 
22 that the motion for summary not be granted. Thank you. 
23 THE COURT: Thank you. The matter is under 
24 advisement. I'll get you a decision as soon as I can. 
25 (Whereupon the hearing was concluded) (C) 
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